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The magnitude of provider uncompensated care has become an important public policy issue.  Yet
existing measures of uncompensated care are flawed because they compare uninsured payments to
list prices, not to the prices actually paid by the insured.  We address this issue using a novel source
of data from a vendor that processes financial data for almost 4000 physicians.  We measure uncompensated
care as the net amount that physicians lose by lower payments from the uninsured than from the insured.
Our best estimate is that physicians provide negative uncompensated care to the uninsured, earning
more on uninsured patients than on insured patients with comparable treatments.  Even our most conservative
estimates suggest that uncompensated care amounts to only 0.8% of revenues, or at most $3.2 billion
nationally.  These results highlight the important distinction between charges and payments, and point
to the need for a re-definition of uncompensated care in the health sector going forward.
Jonathan Gruber












  The high and rising number of uninsured in the United States has led to increased 
concern about their access to health care.  For many uninsured, the primary means of 
access is through uncompensated care from medical providers: care for which the 
uninsured are not billed, or which they receive at a substantial discount.  The existence 
and magnitude of uncompensated care has become an important public policy issue. 
For example, attempts to use provider assessments to finance care for the insured (as 
recently enacted in the state of Massachusetts and debated in the state of California) are 
justified by the savings to providers from their reduced costs of caring for the uninsured.  
In this era of tight fiscal budget constraints at both the state and federal level, assessing 
the amount of funds that are potentially available from uncompensated care to finance 
broader health reform is critical.  
  Previous studies have used different approaches to calculating the amount of 
uncompensated care. In 2006, the American Hospital Association (AHA) collected data 
from hospitals on the amount by which payments fell short of the costs of providing care.  
The AHA calculates that hospitals provided uncompensated care in 2005 equivalent to 
5.6% of their costs for that year, or $28.8 billion dollars. Cunningham and May (2006) 
collected data on physician uncompensated care by surveying physicians and asking them 
what share of their time was spent on charity care. They estimate that 68% of physicians 
provided charity care in 2004-2005, a significant decline from just eight years earlier, and 
that doctors spent on average 6.3% of their time on charity cases. Combining these two 
studies suggests that there may be over $50 billion/year in uncompensated care provided 
in the U.S..   2
The goal of our paper is to measure the cost to one part of the health care system, 
the office-based physician sector, of caring for the uninsured population. In contrast to 
previous studies, we do not compare payments by the uninsured to the prices that they are 
billed, but rather to the prices actually paid by insured patients.  That is, we ask: 
compared to insured patients, how much less do uninsured patients pay for their care? 
The difference between what the insured pay and the uninsured pay is our definition of 
uncompensated care. 
  Our approach differs from previous studies in two key ways. First, most studies 
determine the value of uncompensated care by looking at doctors’ list prices. But since 
doctors negotiate deeply discounted rates with insurance companies (averaging 55% in 
our data), using list prices will overestimate the true amount of uncompensated care. 
Instead, we use data that allow us to determine what doctors actually receive on average 
for each procedure they do. For example, if an uninsured patient receives a procedure 
with a list price of $200, but insurance companies would only pay that doctor $90 on 
average, we say that patient received $90 worth of care.   If the patient paid nothing, we 
call that $90 of uncompensated care. 
  A second difference in our approach is that we allow uncompensated care to be 
negative. If an uninsured patient pays $200 for a procedure for which an insurance 
company would pay that doctor $90, then we say that patient received -$110 of 
uncompensated care. This reflects the fact that a large fraction of the uninsured pay full 
list price (which is typically much greater than what an insured patient would pay), and a 
second large fraction of the population pay nothing. The total effect on a single doctor or 
the industry as a whole can be judged only by combining the effect of both groups.    3
Whether negative uncompensated care should be counted as an offset to positive 
uncompensated care depends on the goal of the exercise.  One goal is to assess the 
aggregate amount of uncompensated care provided by physicians, which is used as an 
important yardstick by public policy makers.  Our approach is consistent with this goal.  
Another goal would be to assess the share of physicians providing charity care, or the 
share of patients receiving such charity care.  In this case, one might not want to use 
“negative” uncompensated care to offset positive charity care.  We show alternative 
results below which address this perspective, and find that uncompensated care in the 
physician sector is still well below common estimates. 
To estimate uncompensated care, we make use of a new data set that includes 
detailed financial records for nearly 4000 doctors and over 4 million patient visits, 
including 160k visits from uninsured patients. For every visit, we know: the patient’s 
insurance coverage, the procedures done, the diagnoses justifying those procedures, the 
price charged, and how much the patient and insurance company paid against each 
charge. 
  Our approach to uncompensated care gives results that are consistent with other 
studies when the same measurement approaches are used, yet dramatically different when 
our alternative measurement approach is used.  Using our data, we estimate 
uncompensated care relative to list prices of 2.7% to 3.2% of physician revenues.   
However, we believe this estimate of uncompensated care is wrong because it’s 
based on list prices. If we instead look at the discounted rates which determine what 
doctors are actually paid, we get a very different picture. While about a quarter of visits 
by the uninsured result in no payment, almost two-thirds of uninsured patients pay more   4
for their care than insured patient, and often much more.  And we find that the majority 
of physicians actually make money, on net, on their uninsured patients.  On net, our best 
estimate of uncompensated care is -0.07%.  That is, the average doctor earns slightly 
more on their uninsured patients than their insured patients.  A more conservative 
estimate places uncompensated care at only about 0.8% of revenues, well below reported 
levels. 
Our paper proceeds as follows.  In Part I, we provide a brief background 
discussion on charity care in health care.  Part II discusses our unique source of data and 
how we will use it to measure uncompensated care.  Part III presents our results, while 
Part IV considers a host of potential biases to our findings and largely dismisses them.  
Part V concludes. 
 
Part I: Background on Charity in the Health Care Sector 
Hospital Charitable Care 
  Charitable care has long been a stated mission of hospitals.  When the Hill-Burton 
Act was passed in 1946, non-profit hospitals were given federal funding in exchange for 
providing a "reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay." The term 
"reasonable volume" was left unclear until 1979, when the minimum was defined as 3% 
of the hospital's expenses or 1/10th of the assistance provided by the federal government.  
Funding is no longer distributed under Hill-Burton, but any hospital that claims tax-
exempt status must document how it is providing a service to the community beyond 
what a profit-seeking business would provide. Again there are few hard requirements,   5
and hospitals are free to draw on everything from free care to the health brochures they 
hand out in waiting rooms. 
  The AHA performs a survey each year to calculate how much free and discounted 
care hospitals provide, and their data suggests hospitals have been providing a level of 
free or discounted care equal to 5-6% of revenue for the last 25 years. This number 
includes two groups of patients: (1) those who were given free or discounted care because 
the hospital determined they were unable to pay, and (2) patients who had the ability to 
pay, as determined by the hospital, but didn’t pay (commonly called “bad debt”). When 
non-profit hospitals report their level of uncompensated care to government agencies, it’s 
common for them to also combine the two types of patients. 
  There is debate over whether hospitals should be allowed to include bad debt 
when calculating their level of charity care because there is substantial difference 
between offering a patient free care from the start and declaring care to be free only after 
the hospital (and collection agencies) have been unable to collect payment. Organizations 
like the Catholic Health Alliance argue that bad debt should be excluded when 
calculating charity care (Catholic Health Association, 2005), and they've held meetings 
with the IRS to argue for revised guidelines. The IRS appears to be moving in that 
direction. Steven T. Miller, The IRS' commissioner of the IRS' Tax Exempt and 
Government Entities Division, recently said "It's hard to see bad debt as charity care 
where collection actions or threats have been brought to bear in the area" (Healthcare 
Financial Management, 2007). The IRS expects to release revised guidelines later in 
2007.    6
  Several states have enacted laws which define a minimum level of charity care 
that non-profit hospitals must provide in order to retain their tax-exempt status. In Texas, 
for example, hospitals must document that they’re providing charity care equal to 4% of 
the hospital's patient revenue, excluding bad debt (Texas Department of State Health 
Services, 2005). 
  The other major consideration with these data is that they measure 
uncompensated care delivered to all patients, not just the uninsured.  Yet expansion of 
insurance coverage is typically motivated by the uncompensated care savings that will 
derive from covering the uninsured; indeed, when insurance coverage expands, 
uncompensated care to the insured can only increase.  We are aware of only three studies 
that attempt to separate the share of uncompensated care provided to insured versus 
uninsured patients, for samples of patients in Florida, Massachusetts and Indiana. 
The results of these studies are fairly consistent: the share of uncompensated care cases 
that are accounted for by the uninsured varies from 35% (Duncan and Kilpatrick, 1987; 
Weissman et al., 1992) to 46% (Saywell et al, 1989), and the share of uncompensated 
care dollars that are accounted for by the uninsured varies from 60% (Saywell et. al, 
1989; Weissman et al., 1992) to 72% (Duncan and Kilpatrick, 1987).. 
 
Physician Charitable Care 
  There is much less work on charitable care by physicians.  The earliest work of 
which we are aware is Sloan, Cromwell and Mitchell (1978), using a 1977 nationwide 
survey of physicians, who found that charity care amounted to 2.7% of gross billings and 
that bad debts accounted for an additional 8.4% of gross billings.  Ohsfeldt (1985) used   7
data from the American Medical Association’s Socioeconomic Monitoring System from 
1982 and found that physician billings were reduced by 9% by charity care and another 
6.3% for bad debt.  Kilpatrick et al. (1991) drew a random sample of physicians in the 
state of Florida and found that 10.4% of the billed amount by physicians was unresolved, 
with roughly half of that amount coming from self-pay patients.  Kilpatrick et al. is the 
only study which separated out physician uncompensated care to insured vs. uninsured 
patients; they find that 31% of uncompensated care cases, representing 52% of 
uncompensated care amounts, were accounted for by the uninsured. 
  The best known recent work in this area is continuing analysis of the Community 
Tracking Survey (CTS) by Peter Cunningham and associates.  The CTS is a nationally 
representative telephone survey of physicians involved in direct care in the continental 
U.S.   This survey asks physicians about the share of patients who receive free or reduced 
price care due to financial need (but without distinguishing insured vs. uninsured), and 
the percentage of practice time spent providing such care.  The most recent round of this 
study (2004-2005) found that 68.2% of physicians provide such “charity care”, and that, 
among physicians providing such care, it amounts to 6.3% of their time.   
 
Part II: Data and Methodology 
  The centerpiece of our analysis is a unique data set the likes of which has never 
been explored to investigate the charitable care issue.  The vendor provides medical 
billing services to doctors across the country, and has detailed financial records for 3860 
physicians in 317 practices in 60 different specialties. The data come from physicians at 
small and large groups, including clinics, academic medical centers, and hospitals. Both   8
for-profit and non-profit groups are included; one quarter of the providers come from 
hospitals or academic medical centers.  
These records have been made available to us with permission from the vendor 
and its physician clients.  Altogether we have data for 4.4 million visits from 1.8 million 
patients that occurred between 9/1/2004 and 3/1/2005. Of those visits, 162,000 were from 
uninsured patients.  For each patient visit, the dataset includes: the procedures performed, 
the diagnoses justifying those procedures, and the financial details associated with each 
procedure done: payments received, discounts given, and amounts written off or sent to 
collection agencies. The dataset includes the patient's insurance information, including  
broad categories: Medicare, Medicaid, Private Insurance, or Uninsured. 
We determine the patient’s coverage by looking at the insurance coverage 
associated with the claim. A patient is considered “uninsured” if the claim for that service 
was never submitted to an insurance company. It’s possible that some of our “uninsured” 
patients indeed have some form of insurance coverage, but appear uninsured in our data 
because they’re either seeing a doctor that’s not covered by the insurance or they’re 
receiving a procedure for which they’re not covered. Therefore, our definition of 
“uninsured” only applies to that visit.  In Part IV, we perform a variety of tests to exclude 
patients who might be considered uninsured only because they’re seeking services not 
covered by insurance. 
  One potential concern with this analysis is that the ultimate insurance coverage of 
the patient does not correspond to the insurance status recorded when the patient checked 
in.  In our data, 3% of visits are from patients who are recorded as uninsured at time of 
check in.  There are an additional 0.71% of visits from patients who are recorded as   9
insured, but who turn out to be uninsured, typically because coverage had expired.  There 
is a very small set of individuals for which the opposite is true (appear uninsured but are 
actually insured). 
  A patient that checks in as an uninsured patient has the potential of being treated 
differently (or might ask to be treated differently) than a patient with insurance. Since our 
goal is to compare insured patients to uninsured patients, both in level of treatment and 
the prices charged, we calculated results for two sets of patients: (1) uninsured patients 
who appeared uninsured when they checked in, and (2) all uninsured patients. The results 
for both sets are similar, so we simply report the results for case (1). 
Of the nearly 4000 doctors in the sample, we excluded every doctor that had less 
than 200 patient visits or $25,000 in revenue over the 6 month period. This restriction 
drops the number of physicians in our sample from 3860 to 2537, but reduces the number 
of patient visits only slightly, from 4.42 million to 4.36 million.  Next we excluded every 
physician without at least one visit from an uninsured patient where we could determine 
the visit's expected payment (defined below), which reduces the number of uninsured 
visits from 162k to 149k and the number of physicians to 2474. 
 
Sampling 
  Our sample is not random, but is rather selected by which practices choose to use 
the services of this particular vendor.  To make our providers look more like the national 
population of doctors, we determined a weighting for each provider based on location, 
specialty, and practice size. Unfortunately, we could not find a single data set that 
provided the joint distribution of physicians along these three dimensions, so we   10
combined data from two sources: published tabulations of the American Medical 
Association (AMA) physician survey (on physician location), and our own tabulations of 
the physician component of the Community Tracking Survey (CTS) (on a cross 
tabulation of physician specialty and practice size).   
  We began by using these data to investigate the representativeness of our sample.  
Our sample is restricted to only 22 states, although they span all regions of the nation; the 
data are relatively oversampled in the states of Massachusetts, Kansas and Ohio.
1  As 
Table 1 shows, our sample is much more likely to consist of large physician practices 
than is the national sample in the CTS survey.  Only 2% of our sample consists of solo 
practitioners, as opposed to 21% of the CTS survey; only 5% of our sample is in practices 
of 2-3 physicians, as opposed to 16% in the CTS survey; and only 11% of our sample is 
in practices of 4-10 physicians, as opposed to 23% in the CTS survey.  In contrast, two-
thirds of our sample is in practices of eleven or more physicians, as opposed to only 21% 
in the CTS survey.  The distribution of specialties in our data is much closer to that in the 
CTS; we somewhat understate medical specialists and overstate 
obstetricians/gynecologists, but the numbers are otherwise very comparable. 
  To weight for these differences, we (a) computed the share of our physicians in 
each state relative to the AMA data and (b) computed the share of our physicians in each 
size/specialty, relative to the CTS data, (c) multiplied these shares for any given 
physician, and (d) used the inverse as a weight.  So, for example, 6% of our sample 
physicians are in California, while the AMA reports that 12% of physicians are in that 
state nationally.  And only 1.3% of our sample are family/general practitioners in 
                                                 
1 The states are: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.   11
practices of size 4-10, while 3.9% of the national CTS sample is in this cell.  So any 
family/general practitioner in a practice of size 4-10 in California receives a weight of the 
inverse of (6/12)*(1.3/3.9), or a weight of 6 in this case. 
  This weighting procedure has two weaknesses.  First, we do not account for any 
covariance between size/specialty and location; for example, if the state of California 
happens to have a particularly high share of family/general practitioners in a practice size 
of 4-10, that would lead us to overweight that observation.  Second, our sample may 
differ from the national sample along dimensions other than size, location and specialty.  
We have no reason to believe that either of these is a problem in practice.  Nevertheless, 
we will show our findings both weighted and unweighted to illustrate the importance of 
this weighting procedure. 
  We compared the patients in our sample against those in the National Ambulatory 
Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), the largest nationally representative data set of 
physician visits. This distribution is similar, particularly once our data are weighted.  The 
NAMCS finds that 60.5% of visits are from patients with private insurance; in our data, 
once weighted, it was 59%. For Medicare, NAMCS finds 26.2% while we find 23%. For  
Medicaid, NAMCS has 10% while our data has 9.3%.  Finally, 3.9% of our visits are 
from the (ex-ante known) uninsured, compared to 4.8% of visits nationally.  There is an 
additional 1.6% of visits in our data that come from patients who are not known to be 
uninsured at the time of service but who end up being uninsured for that procedure.  It is 
unclear how these should be distributed across payers.  Nonetheless, the close 
correspondence of these categories suggests that our sample is fairly nationally 
representative.   12
  It is important to highlight that both our sample and the NAMCS sample to which 
we compare our data considers only physician offices and not hospital outpatient clinics 
which provide a disproportionate share of outpatient uncompensated care.  Yet this is 
appropriate for our analysis since our paper focuses on the amount of physician 
uncompensated care delivered in the U.S., not on hospital uncompensated care (which 
would include outpatient clinics).  As we discuss in the conclusion, our findings for 
physicians do not necessarily extend to the hospital setting, so that the figures from the 
AHA for uncompensated care in that sector are more close to reliable.  But given the 
large amount of uncompensated physician office care that is implied by surveys such as 
Cunningham’s it is important to consider the physician sector as well. 
  
Methodology 
  Our definition of uncompensated care implicitly asks the question: if each 
provider could replace each uninsured patient with an insured patient who received the 
same level of care, would the provider expect to make more or less? If the uninsured 
patient paid the same amount the average insurance company would pay (to the same 
doctor, for the same procedure), then we say there is no uncompensated care. Since we 
look only at payments instead of prices, we completely sidestep the problems associated 
with inflated list prices. 
  To calculate uncompensated care, each visit is broken down into the procedures 
done, and for each procedure we calculate the average payment that doctor would expect 
to receive from doing that procedure on an insured patient; this is the procedure's   13
"expected payment". For every uninsured visit, we sum the expected payments and 
subtract the actual payments; this is our "uncompensated care". 
  A unique expected payment is calculated for every doctor/procedure code 
combination by looking at each doctor's payment history. If a doctor performed a 
procedure less than 5 times, we use the payment history for that procedure for all doctors 
at the practice. If there are still fewer than 5 observations available, the procedure is 
excluded for that doctor, and every visit with that procedure code is excluded.
2  
  One hole in our data is around charges sent to collection agencies: we know how 
much was sent off to collection agencies for visit, but we don’t know how much was 
ultimately recovered and returned to the doctor. This is a large issue since the uninsured 
have a large number of charges sent to collection agencies; in our data, uninsured patients 
collectively paid $7.8 million directly to the practice, but another $8.7 million in charges 
were sent to collection agencies. 
Good data on collection rates are hard to find, but a few sources suggest 
physicians recovery only a small fraction of the charges they send to collections, around 
10%.
3  To assess the sensitivity of our results to collection rates, we calculate all numbers 
under two different assumptions: (1) no charges sent to collections are recovered, and (2) 
10% of charges sent to collections are recovered. 
In summary, our approach uses insured patients as a measure of the opportunity 
cost of serving an uninsured patient.  In doing so we implicitly assume that physicians 
can freely substitute an insured patient for an uninsured patient; that is, that the supply of 
                                                 
2 We can compute expected payments for 95% of the procedures performed on the uninsured in our data.  
Among that group, we compute expected payment using the same physician 93% of the time, and using the 
practice overall 7% of the time. 
3 For example, Hammer (2005) reports that the average netback rate (% of charges returned to doctors, 
after collection fees) is between 7 and 11%.   14
insured patients is perfectly elastic at the point that the uninsured patient is treated.  This 
may not be a reasonable assumption.  Indeed, there is evidence that physicians are less 
willing to take uninsured patients than privately insured patients, which suggests that they 
don’t consider uninsured patients valid alternatives (and therefore may be turning to them 
only when privately insured patients run out).
4 
If this is true, then estimates using privately insured rates as the opportunity cost 
of the uninsured potentially overstate uncompensated care (by overstating the opportunity 
cost of seeing the uninsured patient).  We can bound this problem, however, by using 
Medicaid payments as a measure of opportunity cost.  These same studies show that 
physicians are more willing to see uninsured patients than Medicaid patients; at least with 
uninsured patients, there is some prospect of high reimbursement, while Medicaid 
reimbursement is low both ex ante and ex post.  Therefore, Medicaid payments probably 
understate the opportunity cost of taking the uninsured (since the uninsured are still 
preferred to Medicaid).  As a result, we present our basic results compared to all insured 
patients, but then split into comparisons to the privately and Medicaid insured to bound 
our measure of opportunity cost. 
 
Part III: Basic Results 
We present our results from two perspectives: the physician’s and the patient’s. 
 
Physician Perspective 
  Figure 1 shows the distribution of uncompensated care relative to expected 
payment on average for uninsured patients for each physician.  To provide bounds on our 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Asplin et al. (2003) and Fairbrother et al. (2003).   15
estimates, we consider two extreme cases.  The first, our “Base Definition” which in our 
view most accurately represents the amount of uncompensated care in our data, assumes 
that 10% of charges sent to collection agencies are ultimately collected, and weights the 
data using the procedure described above.  The alternative “Conservative Definition” 
both (a) assumes that zero percent of charges sent to collections agencies are collected 
and (b) does not weight the sample to account for the fact that we have a non-random 
size, specialty and location distribution.   
  In parallel, we present the key facts underlying Figure 1 in Table 2.  In this case, 
we consider all four combinations of weighting vs. not weighting, and assuming zero 
collections vs. assuming 10% collections.  Typically, 80-90% of the effect of moving 
from the lower bound (estimates with weighting and assuming 10% collections) to the 
upper bound (no weighting and assuming no collections) is a result of the weighting, with 
a more minor effect for the collections assumption. 
  Figure 1 shows the difference between what uninsured patients paid and the 
expected payment of insured patients (uncompensated care), as a fraction of that expected 
payment.  We have scaled the graph so that higher numbers mean more uncompensated 
care.  Thus, a value of 1 means the doctor received no payments from his uninsured 
patient; a value of 0 means his uninsured patients paid the same as what insured patients 
would have paid; and a negative value means the doctor found his uninsured patients 
more profitable. 
  While the magnitudes differ, both of these approaches tell a similar story: 45 to 
59% of physicians actually provide negative uncompensated care; that is, they collect 
more, on average, from their uninsured patients than from their insured patients.  Indeed,   16
12 to 14 percent of physicians found their uninsured patients more than twice as 
profitable as their insured patients; that is, the net payments from the uninsured were 
more than twice the expected payments from insured patients (points below -50% in 
Figure 1).  On the other hand, 1 to 7% of physicians delivered all care to their uninsured 
patients for free (values of 100% Figure 1), and 17 to 30% of physicians delivered care to 
their uninsured patients at less than half the cost to insured patients.    
  The remainder of Table 2 shows the results separately for two different payer 
bases: privately insured and Medicaid insured.   In these cases, when computing the 
counterfactual amount that the uninsured would pay if insured, instead of using all 
insured, we use only patients in these categories.  As discussed above, these cases 
provide useful bounds for the opportunity cost of seeing an uninsured patient.  The 
corresponding data are plotted as well in Figure 2.  Note that the sample changes 
somewhat when we use different bases of insured patients. 
  The results for privately insured are similar to those for all payers, but the results 
for Medicaid show considerably less uncompensated care. Compared to the rates received 
for the privately insured, physicians actually provide negative uncompensated care in 40-
56% of the cases.  Compared to the rates received for Medicaid patients, however, 
physicians provide negative uncompensated care 59-76% of the time.  That is, regardless 
of how it is measured, the majority of physicians in our sample receive more payment 
from the uninsured than they do from Medicaid patients.  Even more striking, relative to 
Medicaid reimbursements, 42-57% of physicians make 50% more on the uninsured, and 
23-38% of physicians actually make twice as much on the uninsured as they do on 
Medicaid patients.   17
  Of particular interest is the total amount of uncompensated care delivered by 
physicians in our sample, which is equivalent to the area under the positive part of the 
curve in Figure 1 minus the area under the negative part of the curve.  Table 3 presents 
several statistics on uncompensated care.  We find that uncompensated care, measured 
relative to all insured patients, is -0.07% of patient care revenues using our best estimate, 
and 0.59% of patient care revenue using our upper bound estimate.  Relative to the 
privately insured, uncompensated care ranges from 0.24% of revenues to 0.8% of 
revenues.  Relative to Medicaid, however, uncompensated care ranges from -0.75% of 
revenues to 0.16% of revenues. 
  The next rows show dollars of uncompensated care delivered, on average, per 
visit by the uninsured.  Compared to all insured, physicians deliver between -$2.10 and 
$19.86 in uncompensated care per visit by the uninsured.  Compared to the privately 
insured, the range is from $67 to $26.60; compared to those on Medicaid, the range is 
from -$15 to $4 per visit by the uninsured. 
  Uncompensated care is also highly concentrated among a fraction of providers.  
The next rows show that 1/10
th of providers account for 62% of all uncompensated care, 
providing uncompensated care equal to 4.7% to 11.3% of their patient revenue. The top 
quarter of physicians generate an amount greater than the entire industry (that is, the 
other 75% generate negative uncompensated care). 
  We can also translate our findings to aggregate dollars of uncompensated care.  
Total physician practice revenues in the United States in 2004 were $399 billion. Our 
central findings suggest that uncompensated care was -0.07% of this amount, or negative 
$300 million.  The range of opportunity costs and measurement approaches suggests that   18
the amount of uncompensated care is fairly tightly estimated: it ranges from -0.72% 
(compared to Medicaid, base definition), or -$2.9 billion, to 0.8% (compared to private 
insurance, conservative definition), or $3.2 billion.   
 
Physician Perspective – Positive Uncompensated Care Only 
  The analysis presented in the previous section considers the aggregate 
uncompensated care delivered by physicians, adding both the amounts of positive 
uncompensated care delivered to those who pay less than the insured, and the negative 
amounts of uncompensated care delivered to those who pay more than the insured.   
As noted in the introduction, whether these negative and positive amounts should be 
combined depends on one’s perspective on the current exercise.  Our primary goal is to 
assess the aggregate amount of uncompensated care provided by physicians, which is 
used as an important yardstick by public policy makers, and we therefore incorporate 
both positive and negative uncompensated care in our calculations. 
  But this approach has the awkward feature that it presumes that negative 
uncompensated care is somehow “different” than other means that physicians have at 
their disposal to fund charity care.  If a physician delivers care to some uninsured patients 
at a discount, he can offset that loss in a number of ways beyond charging list prices to 
other uninsured patients, for example by charging more to privately insured patients or by 
seeing a more profitable mix of other patients. It is not clear why we should count higher 
prices to the uninsured “against” the amount of charity delivered when we don’t consider 
these other offsets as well.  Therefore, there is a coherent case for simply examining the   19
positive uncompensated care delivered by physicians, and not offsetting against this the 
negative. 
  Table 4 repeats the calculations from Table 3, except it only looks at patients with 
positive uncompensated care. In other words, we sum the losses generated by those who 
underpay but we don’t offset those losses by those who overpay.  By this calculation, 
uncompensated care increases to 0.86-1.15% of revenues.  This is still well below typical 
measures of uncompensated care for the physician sector.  By comparing Tables 3 and 4, 
we can tell that for every dollar lost on an uninsured patient who pays less than an 
insured patient, between $0.56 and $0.93 is recovered from another uninsured patient 
who pays more than the average insured patient. 
 
Patient Perspective 
  How often do uninsured patients pay more than an uninsured patient would pay 
for the same care? Our results are shown in Table 5, and we again include versions 
without and without weighting, and with and without collections. Between 35 and 53% of 
patients receive some uncompensated care.  That is, a minority of patients actually paid 
less than the typical insured patient receiving the same procedures, and 47-65% of 
uninsured patients actually paid more than the average insured patient.   
  We estimate that 26% of patients (44% if unweighted) paid nothing before 
collections, and for that group more than half of their cases were sent to collection 
agencies.  Since we don’t know what fraction of those patients ultimately made 
payments, we leave the 10% collections column blank.  On the other hand, we find that   20
8.5 to 9.6% of uninsured patients paid more than double what their insured counterparts 
paid for the same procedure. 
If we use private insurance or Medicaid as our baseline, we find roughly the same 
share of patients receiving uncompensated care, but the magnitude of uncompensated 
care is different: for 25-33% of the visits, for example, the patient paid twice what the 
average Medicaid patient would have paid.  Note once again that the results are 
somewhat different across these panels due to a changing sample of physicians. 
   
Prices Charged 
  One interesting question that can be addressed using our data is whether 
uncompensated care arises mostly from physicians charging lower prices to the uninsured 
than to the insured (ex-ante discounts), or from the uninsured not paying full the amounts 
charged to them (ex-post writeoffs).  That is, if uninsured patients paid the amount that 
they were billed, how much uncompensated care would there be?  
  The evidence here clearly shows that most uncompensated care arises from the 
uninsured not paying their bills, rather than receiving ex-ante discounts (relative to the 
insured).  Only 13% of the uninsured were billed less than the insured; only 7% were 
billed nothing, and only 8% were billed half or less of the amount billed to the insured 
(including the 7% who were billed nothing).  On the other hand, 87% of the uninsured 
were billed more than the insured, reflecting the discounts off list prices received by the 
insured but not shared by the uninsured.  Forty-four percent of the uninsured were 
charged 50% more than the insured, and 23% of the uninsured were charged double or 
more the amount charged to the insured.   21
 
Actual vs. Reported Uncompensated Care 
  Our results thus far are quite striking, suggesting that physicians don’t actually 
provide much uncompensated care, despite survey evidence to the contrary.  Is this result 
because physicians aren’t reporting the truth in surveys, or because they are calculating 
uncompensated care relative to list rather than discounted prices? 
  The evidence here strongly favors the latter interpretation. Table 6 shows 
uncompensated care computed in the “traditional” way.  This table mimics our procedure, 
but instead compares the amounts paid by the uninsured to list prices (rather than net 
payments by the insured).  The vast majority of physicians collect less than list prices 
from their uninsured patients, and 40-57% of visits by the uninsured result in a payment 
below list price.  The average “underpayment” (amount paid less than list price) ranges 
from 48.7% to 67.7%.  Relative to list prices, then, physicians are providing 
uncompensated care on average of $93 to $128 per visit, or 2.7% to 3.2% of revenues, 
well above the amounts we show in Table 3. 
These estimates are about half of the share of practice time devoted to charity care 
reported by Cunningham and May (2006), but that charity care level included any patient 
for whom charity care was provided, insured or not.  As noted earlier, Kilpatrick et al. 
(1991) found that about half of uncompensated care was delivered to the uninsured; 
extrapolating to our results, we would estimate total uncompensated care levels of 5.4% 
to 6.4%, which is directly in line with the Cunningham and May estimates.  Therefore, 
we conclude that the high levels of uncompensated care reported in previous studies are   22
the result not of poor reporting, but rather of a (in our opinion, faulty) comparison to list 
prices. 
 
Part IV: Potential Biases to the Calculation 
  We find that physicians deliver, on net, very little (if any) uncompensated care, 
but several features of our analysis suggest caution before extrapolating this result.  In 
this section, we explore these concerns further. 
 
Bias from Elective Processes? 
  A primary concern with our results is that we are defining insurance status at the 
visit level, not the patient level.  Thus, some of our “uninsured” visits may actually be 
from insured patients who are not covered for that particular visit.  For example, if our 
data include a large number of patients receiving elective or cosmetic procedures not 
covered by insurance (or patients choosing to pay cash to avoid insurance constraints), 
then this should not count against the uncompensated care delivered to those truly 
uninsured.  In this section, we address that concern, and show it not to be a significant 
determinant of our findings. 
Table 7 shows the 20 most common diagnoses for uninsured patients in the 
sample.  The first column shows the ranking of that procedure in terms of frequency for 
the uninsured, and the second column shows the share of uninsured visits for which this 
was the primary diagnosis.  The third column shows the comparable rank for the insured 
and the share of insured visits for which this was the primary diagnosis.     23
There is a very strong correspondence across these groups.  Fourteen of the 
twenty most common diagnoses for the uninsured are also in the top twenty diagnoses for 
the insured; eighteen are in the top thirty diagnoses for the insured.  The shares are also 
very similar.  Thus, the procedures which make up the most common treatments of the 
uninsured are common procedures performed on the insured as well; our data do not 
appear to largely reflect “elective” procedures that are uncovered for that visit.  At the 
same time, there are clearly examples of this type of visit in our data, as shown by the 
row for “myopia”, which is very common for the uninsured and not so for the insured; 
this clearly reflects the fact that many of those treated for myopia are insured individuals 
not covered by that service.  
  To address this issue more comprehensively, we ranked all procedures by the 
fraction of the time they were performed on uninsured patients. For example, 40% of 
patients receiving acupuncture appear uninsured; presumably this includes patients who 
have insurance that won’t cover the procedure.  On the other hand, only 1.6% of patients 
receiving a pap smear are uninsured; since virtually all insurance (other than hospital-
only coverage) would cover this procedure, the patients reported uninsured are 
presumably truly uninsured. 
  We then replicated our analysis excluding subsets of procedures with particularly 
high shares of uninsured (like myopia or acupuncture), on the grounds that these 
procedures may represent care actually delivered to the insured. In fact, if we exclude all 
procedures where more than 15% of the users were uninsured, our estimate of total 
uncompensated care remains unchanged. As we lower the cut-off and exclude more 
procedures, our estimate of uncompensated care per visit actually falls.  This result is   24
sensible: patients classified as uninsured for elective procedures are more likely to be 
actually insured, and are therefore more likely to pay their bills.  If we only looked at 
procedures where less than 3% of patients were uninsured (which excludes half of the 
procedures done), uncompensated care per visit is cut in half. This is strong evidence that 
our results aren’t driven by elective procedures.  
 
Bias from Out of Network Physicians? 
  Another source of bias to our calculations could be that our “uninsured” patients 
are really insured patients who aren’t receiving elective procedures – but who are 
receiving them from “elective physicians”, that is physicians who are not covered by their 
insurance.  This should not be a major issue for our analysis, since even if patients are 
going out of network their utilization will be reported back to their insurance and they 
will be classified as insured patients in our data.  Nevertheless, we can investigate the 
importance of this issue by excluding from our sample physicians who appear to be 
“elective”: that is, physicians where the uninsured are likely to pay the full bill.  Of 
course, this approach confounds the issue by also getting rid of those physicians who are 
most aggressive in collecting from the “truly uninsured”, so in doing so we will by 
definition overstate the amount of uncompensated care delivered. 
  Even this aggressive approach, however, does not suggest that such elective 
physicians are driving our results.  If we remove from our sample all physicians where 
half or more of their uninsured patients pay their full bill, the amount of uncompensated 
care delivered in aggregate in our sample rises from only -0.07% (our best estimate from   25
Table 3) to 0.66% of revenues – still a very small number compared to reported 
uncompensated care. 
 
Bias from Health Differences by Insurance Status 
Our assumption that the payments from insured patients represent the opportunity 
cost of uninsured patients rests on a presumption that the two groups are similarly costly 
to treat.  If an uninsured patient is much sicker, however, and therefore requires more 
physician time or effort, then the relevant opportunity cost may not be payment from an 
insured patient but some higher figure. Of course, if this variation is reflected only in the 
different procedures performed on insured and uninsured patients, then it is captured by 
our procedure-specific methodology.  There may, however, be variation in health across 
insurance types within procedure - perhaps a 15-minute office visit from an uninsured 
patient requires more effort than a 15-minute visit from an insured patient. 
To test this hypothesis, we use the diagnoses which are recorded as part of each 
visit, and assume that visits with more diagnoses require more effort. Our data shows that 
the uninsured on average have no more diagnoses per visit than patients with other types 
of coverage: 1.58 diagnoses per visit the uninsured patient, 1.60 for Medicaid, 1.64 for 
private insurance, and 2.07 for Medicare. 
However, the comparison above could be misleading if the uninsured population 
is somehow different, or seeing a different set of doctors (although Table 1 suggests that 
this is not the case).  For example, a patient visiting a dermatologist for acne will likely 
have only one diagnoses for his visit, but if the same patient visited a general practitioner 
for a yearly physical, the list might be longer. To be sure we're comparing similar visits,   26
we can ask the question differently: "For every visit for a respiratory infection, how many 
other diagnoses were recorded as part of that visit?" If we ask the question for any of the 
most common diagnoses -- chest pain, respiratory infections, stomache ache, routine 
exam, or pharyngitis -- the result is always the same: the uninsured have fewer diagnoses 
recorded per visit, and therefore appear no less healthy than insured patients. If anything, 
they appear healthier. 
 
Bias From Cost-Shifting? 
  One limitation of our analysis is that it ignores the fact that the prices charged the 
insured may themselves be directly influenced by the level of uncompensated care 
provided, through the mechanism of cost-shifting.  If a physician raises his prices on 
insured patients to compensate for uninsured patients who underpay, there is a potential 
bias from our using those prices to measure the level of uncompensated care. However, 
raising prices on the insured to pay for the uninsured will increase the level of 
uncompensated care, not decrease it. Therefore, if price-shifting exists in our data, the 
amount of uncompensated care will be overstated.  Our analysis of this issue suggests 
that any effect of price shifting is very modest. 
 
Part IV: Conclusions and Implications 
  The provision of uncompensated care is an important touchstone for health care 
policy in the U.S.  Many argue that the uninsured are already implicitly insured through 
the provision of uncompensated care.  Others use the existence of uncompensated care as 
a justification for, and potential financing source of, universal insurance coverage.  But   27
such debates begin with a flawed definition of uncompensated care that does not 
recognize the realities of the U.S. health care market, and in particular the enormous 
discounts delivered to insured patients relative to the list prices charged the uninsured.   
  In this paper we have considered an alternative approach which recognizes those 
discounts by comparing the prices paid to the uninsured to those paid by the insured.  
Doing so provides a very different picture of the level of uncompensated care provided 
by physicians.  While the physicians in our sample appear to be providing charity care for 
the uninsured that amounts to between 2.7 % and 3.2% of their practice revenues, in fact 
the uninsured are paying more, on net, for their care than are the insured.  At most, the 
uninsured are receiving price discounts that are 0.8% of practice revenues. 
  This is a striking finding which throws into doubt many of the arguments noted 
above.  Of course, physician uncompensated care is only a minority of the total amount 
of uncompensated care provided in the U.S.  The important question is whether applying 
the type of approach considered here to hospitals would lead to dramatic reductions in 
their reported uncompensated care.   
  The computations of hospital uncompensated care from the AHA also rely on list 
prices, which would tend to overstate uncompensated care by the arguments provided 
here.  At the same time, the AHA adjusts reported uncompensated care downward by the 
hospital’s overall cost/charge ratio, which will bring the opportunity cost measure more 
in line with net payments from the insured (although probably not all the way).  
Moreover, the uninsured are likely to be paying a much smaller fraction of their (large) 
hospital bills than they are of their (smaller) physician bills, which suggests that hospitals 
aren’t getting as much return as physicians on the uninsured.     28
  Thus, it seems clear that the AHA measure of uncompensated care overstates 
hospital uncompensated care much less than do survey measures of physicians.  Whether 
the AHA measure overstates uncompensated care at all, and by how much, is an 
important topic for future research.   29
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Table 1: Weighting Factors 




Speciality: Family/General Practice 18.58% 16.99% .91 
Speciality: Internal Medicine  14.71% 14.27% .97 
Speciality: Medical Specialties 23.82% 29.34% 1.23 
Speciality: ObGyn  14.50% 6.25% .43 
Speciality: Pediatrics  10.61% 7.83% .74 
Speciality: Psychiatry  1.87% 6.47% 3.46 
Speciality: Surgical Specialties  15.90% 18.84% 1.19 
Practice Size: 1  1.87% 23.75% 12.71 
Practice Size: 2-3  4.82% 16.45% 3.42 
Practice Size: 4-10  11.77% 23.97% 2.04 
Practice Size: 11-199  54.22% 14.84% .27 
Practice Size: 200+  5.42% 3.75% .69 
Practice Size: other  21.90% 17.23% .79 
 
 
Note: Table shows the relative national and sample-specific distribution of practice 
characteristics that are used to develop our scaling factors.  First column shows the 
percentage in the sample represented by that specialty or size.  The second column shows 
the comparable figure for the national sample (from CTS, as described in text).  Third 
column is the ratio, which we use to scale the data.  32



























































Conservative Definition (unweighted & no
collections)
Base Definition (weighted & 10% collections)
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Table 2: Physician Perspective -- Total Uncompensated Care for the Uninsured 
 Weighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Unweighted 








Relative to all insured 
% Physicians earning 0 on 
uninsured  2.2% 5.4% 1.9% 7.8% 
% Physicians earning 
50% less on uninsured  17.1% 20.7% 26.2% 30.5% 
% Physicians earning 
more on uninsured  58.3% 57.1% 46.8% 44.4% 
% Physicians earning 
50% more on uninsured  13.3% 13.0% 12.4% 11.5% 
% Physicians earning 
100% more on uninsured  3.1% 2.8% 2.9% 2.8% 
Relative to private insurance 
% Physicians earning 0 on 
uninsured  2.2% 5.4% 2.1% 8.0% 
% Physicians earning 
50% less on uninsured  18.5% 20.8% 28.4% 32.7% 
% Physicians earning 
more on uninsured  54.3% 50.6% 41.9% 39.8% 
% Physicians earning 
50% more on uninsured  11.2% 11.0% 10.0%  9.5% 
% Physicians earning 
100% more on uninsured  2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 2.2% 
Relative to Medicaid 
% Physicians earning 0 on 
uninsured  3.3% 8.4% 2.2% 10.1% 
% Physicians earning 
50% less on uninsured  12.5% 17.3% 18.6% 27.1% 
% Physicians earning 
more on uninsured  75.4% 72.9% 63.3% 59.5% 
% Physicians earning 
50% more on uninsured  57.8% 55.5% 43.8% 41.5% 
% Physicians earning 
100% more on uninsured  39.0% 38.2% 24.1% 22.5% 
 
Note:  Results from calculations described in text (and shown in Figure 1). Top panel 
compares uninsured to all insured; next two panels divide comparison group into 
privately insured and Medicaid insured.  First column shows results for our base case that 
is weighted and assumes 10% collection rate; other columns vary weighting and 
collection assumption.   35
 
Table 3: Total Uncompensated Care for the Uninsured 
 Weighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Unweighted 








Relative to all insured 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Patient Revenues  -0.07% 0.09%  0.43%  0.59% 
Average Uncomp Care $ 
Per Uninsured Visit  $-2.10 $2.61 $14.42 $19.86 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 10% docs  6.62% 7.88% 10.95%  12.24% 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 25% docs  3.02% 3.42% 3.99% 4.74% 
Relative to private insurance 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Patient Revenues  0.24% 0.39% 0.65% 0.80% 
Average Uncomp Care $ 
Per Uninsured Visit  $6.96 $11.30 $21.60 $26.65 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 10% docs  9.01% 10.15% 12.78% 14.37% 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 25% docs  4.11% 4.36% 5.42% 6.17% 
Relative to Medicaid 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Patient Revenues  -0.72% -0.50% -0.06%  0.16% 
Average Uncomp Care $ 
Per Uninsured Visit  $-14.95 $-9.94  $-1.42  $3.97 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 10% docs  5.01% 6.04% 8.18% 9.63% 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 25% docs  1.34% 1.90% 2.57% 3.17% 
 
Note: Top panel compares uninsured to all insured; next two panels divide comparison 
group into privately insured and Medicaid insured.  First column shows results for our 
base case that is weighted and assumes 10% collection rate; other columns vary 
weighting and collection assumption.  First row in each panel shows the average of the 
ratio of uncompensated care to patient revenues across our sample; the second row shows 
the average dollars of uncompensated care. Third and fourth rows show uncompensated 
care as a share of revenues for the 10% and 25% of physicians who provide the most 
uncompensated care.   36
 
Table 4: Uncompensated Care for the Uninsured, Underpayment only 
 Weighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Unweighted 








Relative to all insured 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Patient Revenues  0.86% 1.02% 0.99% 1.15% 
Average Uncomp Care $ 
Per Uninsured Visit  $25.08 $29.70 $33.12 $38.47 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 10% docs  8.10% 9.29% 12.12%  13.41% 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 25% docs  3.82% 4.51% 5.06% 5.86% 
Relative to private insurance 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Patient Revenues  1.07% 1.22% 1.14% 1.28% 
Average Uncomp Care $ 
Per Uninsured Visit  $30.65 $34.93 $37.79 $42.78 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 10% docs  10.50% 11.32% 13.93% 15.23% 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 25% docs  4.88% 5.68% 6.37% 7.07% 
Relative to Medicaid 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Patient Revenues  0.70% 0.96% 0.79% 1.03% 
Average Uncomp Care $ 
Per Uninsured Visit  $14.40 $19.25 $20.00 $25.15 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 10% docs  7.30% 7.18% 9.45% 11.25% 
Uncomp Care as % of 
Reveues -- top 25% docs  2.66% 3.44% 3.48% 4.31% 
 
Note: Top panel compares uninsured to all insured; next two panels divide comparison 
group into privately insured and Medicaid insured.  First column shows results for our 
base case that is weighted and assumes 10% collection rate; other columns vary 
weighting and collection assumption.  First row in each panel shows the average of the 
ratio of uncompensated care to patient revenues across our sample (using only positive 
uncompensated care, unlike Table 4); the second row shows the average dollars of 
uncompensated care. Third and fourth rows show uncompensated care as a share of 
revenues for the 10% and 25% of physicians who provide the most uncompensated care. 
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Table 5: Patient Perspective -- Uncompensated Care for the Uninsured 
 Weighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Unweighted 








Relative to all insured 
% Visits with no 
payment  ----  26.9% ---- 44.1% 
% Visits paying 50% 
less than insured  29.0% 29.9% 46.2% 47.6% 
% Visits paying more 
than insured  64.2% 64.1% 46.5% 46.2% 
% Visits paying 50% 
more than insured  26.6% 26.5% 21.7% 21.6% 
% Visits paying 100% 
more than insured  9.6% 9.6% 8.6% 8.5% 
Relative to private insurance 
% Visits with no 
payment  ----  26.6% ---- 42.6% 
% Visits paying 50% 
less than insured  29.3% 29.9% 45.6% 46.7% 
% Visits paying more 
than insured  63.4% 63.3% 45.6% 45.4% 
% Visits paying 50% 
more than insured  22.1% 22.1% 17.1% 17.0% 
% Visits paying 100% 
more than insured  7.6% 7.6% 6.5% 6.5% 
Relative to Medicaid 
% Visits with no 
payment  ---- 35.0% ---- 50.4% 
% Visits paying 50% 
less than insured  23.9% 37.2% 45.7% 52.4% 
% Visits paying more 
than insured  61.7% 60.9% 46.2% 44.9% 
% Visits paying 50% 
more than insured  50.5% 50.2% 38.2% 37.6% 
% Visits paying 100% 
more than insured  32.1% 31.9% 24.9% 24.5% 
 
Note: Results from calculations described in text.  Top panel compares uninsured to all 
insured; next two panels divide comparison group into privately insured and Medicaid 
insured.  First column shows results for our base case that is weighted and assumes 10% 
collection rate; other columns vary weighting and collection assumption.     38
 
Table 6: Uncompensated Care, Calculated from List Prices 
 Weighted  Weighted  Unweighted  Unweighted 








% Providers who collect less 
than list price  94.8% 94.8% 95.1%  95.1% 
% Visits with payment less 
than list price  39.8% 39.8% 57.0%  57.0% 
Average % underpayment  48.7%  51.7%  64.4%  67.7% 
Average $ underpayment, 
per visit  $93.36 $98.93 $121.39  $127.63 
Underpayment as % of 
Patient Revenue, calculated 
from list prices 
2.7% 2.8% 3.0%  3.2% 
 
Note: First column shows results for our base case that is weighted and assumes 10% 
collection rate; other columns vary weighting and collection assumption.     39
 
Table 7: Most Frequent Diagnoses for Uninsured (Compared to Insured) 
Diagnosis  UI 
Rank  UI %  Ins 
Rank  Ins % 
V202: Routine Infant Or Child Health 
Check  1 1.73% 1 2.16%
78650: Chest Pain, Unspecified  2 1.66% 6  .92%
V0481: Need For Prophylactic Vaccination 
And Inoculation Against Influenza  3 1.28% 2 1.22%
4659: Acute Upper Respiratory Infections 
Of Unspecified Site  4 1.06% 4 1.06%
V700: Routine General Medical 
Examination At A Health Care Facility 
Health Checkup 
5 .98% 5 1.05%
V7231: Special Investigations And 
Examinations, Routine Gynecological 
Examination 
6 .97% 3 1.2%
462: Acute Pharyngitis  7 .85% 7  .87%
3671: Myopia  8 .84% 324  .03%
4011: Essential Hypertension, Benign  9 .84% 10  .63%
4660: Acute Bronchitis  10 .81% 9  .64%
78900: Abdominal Pain, Unspecified Site  11 .67% 23  .35%
V221: Supervision Of Other Normal 
Pregnancy  12 .67% 8 .74%
4619: Acute Sinusitis, Unspecified  13 .66% 11  .6%
7242: Lumbago  14 .6% 13  .53%
4019: Essential Hypertension, Unspecified  15 .57% 18  .4%
5990: Urinary Tract Infection, Site Not 
Specified  16 .52% 19 .39%
7295: Pain In Limb  17 .45% 28  .31%
311: Depressive Disorder, Not Elsewhere 
Classified  18 .42% 47 .2%
25000: Diabetes Mellitus Without Mention 
Of Complication, Type Ii Or Unspecified 
Type, Not Stated As Uncontrolled 
19 .41% 29 .3%
V222: Pregnant State, Incidental  20 .39% 26  .32%
 
Note: First column shows rank of procedure for uninsured; second column shows share 
of uninsured procedures that are represented by that procedure; third and fourth columns 
do the same for the insured. 